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Finite Change – Implication for Trade Theory, Policy and Development 
 
Abstract 
The paper traces the evolution of trade theory beyond the standard 2X2 models and 
looks for implications of higher dimensional structures and adjustment problems 
with large shocks. Typically trade theory and policy talk about expansion and 
contraction of existing activities. In this paper we explore various situations where 
certain activities vanish altogether. Similarly other activities may come to existence 
following major changes in the economic environment. Such regime shifts are 
interpreted as finite changes as opposed to infinitesimal alterations. These changes 
allow us to think differently about standard policy changes, all of which have direct 
implications for developing countries. Emigration, wage inequality and distribution, 
non-equivalence of tariff and quota in competitive models, capital mobility and 
corruption are some of the applications involving such finite change. At a theoretical 
level the paper starts by an interesting interpretation of factor price “non-
equalization” hypothesis in the basic Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson type models 
without depending on standard text book type argument. 
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1. Introduction and Preliminaries 
Trade should lead to specialization. This is universally accepted as the 
fundamental lesson derived from pure theory of international trade. The start up 
model of the discipline, the well known Ricardian theory of comparative advantage 
talks about the extreme case where trade leads to complete specialization. The 
intrinsic message is that for a country to reap the benefits from international trade, it 
is wise to concentrate on production of a few goods and services, export them and in 
turn enjoy a wide range of consumption items. Thus the process of international 
trade necessarily eliminates production of certain goods. Inability to sustain 
competition from the rest of the world leads to closure of certain activities. In a 
standard two-good Ricardian model competition leads to complete specialization 
and all workers are absorbed in a single economic activity. Thus the adjustment 
mechanism does not allow only contraction in output of the import competing 
sectors, but a total shut down. In mathematical terms such changes cannot be treated 
in terms of calculas. These are not small changes. We define them as “finite change”. 
In a standard textbook kind of analysis we do generally find a diagram like 
the following one (Figure-1). Though we frequently talk about the implications of 
different equilibrium points, we do not focus particularly on the bearing of such 
points for “finite” and “infinite“ change. Let us briefly explain such phenomenon in 
a Ricardian structure where we consider a world consisting of two countries 
producing two goods (X and Y) using a single factor of production labor (L). The 
world PPF (production possibility frontier) would be kinked one as shown in the 
diagram. The shape and/or slope of different segments of the kinked PPF depends 
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on the technology of different countries. Production equilibrium may take place 
anywhere on the PPF. We are concerned about three equilibrium points: on the 
vertical axis (A); on the horizontal axis(C); and at the point of kink (B). At A (C) both 
the countries specialize in Y(X). This indicates complete closure of either X or Y. 
However, trade is not possible in such cases as countries are left with no other  
                   Y 
                            A 
            B      
        
 
        C 
                   O             X 
    Figure-1  
commodities that could be traded. Whereas, equilibrium at B allows for trade inspite 
of having complete specialization. One produces only X and the other produces Y. 
This also resembles complete specialization and hence complete shutdown of 
another activity.  This is the issue that we generally refer to as “finite change” in 
trade theory since trade is not stopped even if some activities are stopped. 
Concept of finite change or large shocks is important in understanding the 
process of growth and development. Aggregate models of economic growth hide a 
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lot of effects which alter the structure and composition of produced goods and 
services. Some goods vanish and new goods emerge due to technological and other 
transformation. In particular external competition may shut down some sectors, 
reward occupations that were not properly rewarded in a closed economy. As we 
shall prove eventually, large shocks may raise return to certain factors in particular 
industry but eventually that industry may vanish yielding place to either a new one 
or to an existing but more competitive one. The fact that we allow the industry to 
vanish, the concerned factor continues to enjoy its rising fortune. 
While in the standard Ricardian framework finite change is bound to happen, 
the major workhorse in trade theory, the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) 
framework does not yield complete specialization as a definitive outcome. In fact the 
emphasis is on incomplete specialization even if trade squeezes the import 
competing sector1 . 
Jones (1974) is probably the earliest attempt to formalize the idea of finite 
change in the HOS framework though the model did not particularly emphasize the 
concept of finite change. A small country having the potential to produce many 
goods with two factors of production capital (K) and labor (L) will end up producing 
either one good or two goods. In figure-2, borrowed from Jones (1974) goods 1, 2 and 
3 are ranked according to capital intensities. As the endowment ratio  of a country 
                                                           
1 More recent popular analytical structure developed by Krugman (1979) and Melitz (2003) warrant 
special mention. In Krugman-Dixit-Stiglitz (KDS) type framework exposure to trade increases 
number of varieties without eliminating any of the domestic varieties. Thus production reallocation is 
not an issue. In Melitz variety of models trade may actually lead to the exit of relatively unproductive 
firms and that itself has a positive productivity impact. But it is essentially an intra-industry outcome. 
The industry itself is not eliminated in equilibrium. We shall return later to the issue of intra-industry 
finite changes. 
6 
 
moves from a high to a low value, pattern of specialization changes for this small 
country.  coincides with the capital intensity of the first good,  lies between the 
intensities of 1 and 2 and the country produces 1 and 2. If  moves further down to 
the right to  
 
K    
         
  1    
                 
           2 
                    
                                               
         3 
 O           L 
Figure-2 
	production of 1 vanishes and with , production of 2 vanishes as well. So if we 
consider a change in  over time the other way round, moving up from  to , may 
be through a process of growth, technical progress and accumulation of capital 
sectors such as 3 and 2 will cease to exist. 
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Figure-3 describes the very familiar relationship between		
, the factor price 
ratio and		
. Note that when the country is completely specialized, an increase in 
		
 must increase

	
 because of diminishing marginal productivity (DMP) and 
constant returns to scale (CRS). With incomplete specialization two goods are 
produced and  
 
	
 
 
          1 
                2 and 1     
     3 and 2    2 
       3 
 
 
 O            
Figure-3 
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with given commodity prices  and 	are uniquely determined2. The endowments 
cannot affect factor prices on the “flat” segment in Figure-3. As the economy moves 
from a low to high , sectors vanish and sectors emerge. 
So far what we have shown is fairly standard and well known. But there are certain 
salient features of the specialization pattern worth a mention. 
(a) Let us think of capital (K) as skilled labor and therefore 

	  acts as a very basic 
distributional indicator. If the economy concerned is producing 1 and 2, and 
there is an increase in L, wage distribution will remain invariant for a while. 
But definitely same is not true if the economy is forced to specialize in 2. 
Further decline in  will reduce  	 , worsening the distributional index. Thus 
finite change may fundamentally alter the pattern of factor price movement 
following exogenous shocks. 
(b) Movement in relative prices will tend to shift segments of the curve in Figure-
3. Though labor-saving technological progress in labor-intensive sector will 
increase wage contrary to the expectation derived from the usual partial 
equilibrium framework. Once such a change leads to complete specialization, 
the result will be reversed. This is eloquently argued in Findlay and Jones 
(2000). Thus finite change will alter qualitative outcome.  
(c) The figure also shows that countries specializing in different sets of goods will 
not have their factor prices equalized even if they are identical otherwise. 
Differences in endowments may allow them to specialize in all goods but 
                                                           
2 It is worth noting that sometimes in the standard HOS model if two countries specialize in different 
sets of goods factor prices will not be equalized. We do not need the standard assumptions such as 
factor intensity reversals etc.  Complete specialization is not needed also. The only requirement is 
specialization in different sets of goods. We shall discuss such issues in Section 4. 
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different sets of goods. Also with changes in endowments factor prices will 
start diverging. If one studies 2x2 models, it would seem that, complete 
specialization is necessary for factor prices to diverge. But that is not true in 
many-commodity models. Even if countries remain incompletely specialized 
producing a subset of goods, factor price equalization will not hold. 
 
2. Finite Change and Tariff-Quota Non-Equivalence 
Following the earlier section and essentially Jones (1974) one could argue that 
the backstage of a 2X2 HOS system may contain a set of competitively non-viable set 
of industries such that for ,  derived from the competitive price conditions 
relevant for goods 1 and 2, the set of active production sectors, it may be the case 
that  
,  >  ,																 = 3,4, … . . … ,        (1) 
Where , 	is the minimum average cost of producing ith good,  = 3,4, … . . … ,  
and ∗ is the world price of the ith good. 
One interesting exercise is to consider a trade policy that seeks to protect a 
few of the “closed” industries either through a tariff or a quota. This problem was 
considered by Choi and Marjit (1998). Without loss of generality, let us assume that 
sector 3 is the targeted sector for protection with initially  = 0 . Let the policy 
instrument be a unit tariff  . 
Therefore, for  > 0,   must be such that  
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,  ≤ ∗ +      ((∗ +  ) is the world price of 3)     (2)             
If goods 1 and 2 continue to be produced,  
  ,  = ∗ +               (3)              
Note that given , ,	 ,  are uniquely determined under the usual assumption 
of neo-classical production theory implying (3) to hold for any amount of . 
As  rises from level zero, both labor and capital are drawn from  and .  and 
 adjusts through the Rybczynski mechanism as long as the resource crunch allows 
them to lie within the cone of diversification. One cannot rule out the possibility that 
the entire import-demand for  is wiped out through such a process and t  turns out 
to be highly restrictive. 
Now, think of a quota on import of . Given prices, such a quota will 
uniquely determine the local production of  and the resource extraction from 
	and  and their levels of production. Note that by construction entire import-
demand cannot be eliminated through such protectionary measures. Thus in an 
otherwise competitive system a tariff and a quota will have asymmetric effects and 
tariff can turn out to be more restrictive. This is a clear hint towards a non-
equivalence result. The idea exploited in this analysis is related to a flat average cost 
function for all industries which are not viable under free trade. Any price protection 
to such industries must entail a support for all output levels. Whereas, quantitative 
protection pins down to a maximum amount that can be produced locally. More 
generally the proposition points towards the asymmetry between price and quantity 
related regulation in a competitive environment. 
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Figure-4 
Initially OA was the amount of import with	# > ∗, the world price. As tariff 
t equates # 	and ∗, the entire demand can be satisfied through domestic source. 
Hence, OB may reflect zero import or total import restriction. Instead a quota 
trivially guarantees some import. Thus a tariff is more restrictive than quota. 
3. A Complex Production Structure 
Consider a scenario, a closed economy environment where there are n 
industries and within each industry there are $ varieties  = 1,… . . , of goods. 
Thus one may be an electronic goods sector, one may be the textile sector and so on. 
Within an industry, there are variety of goods produced using labor and a common 
type of capital &. Thus labor is mobile across industries and within an industry 
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across varieties. Capital is specific to an industry but mobile across varieties within 
the industry. In a closed economy, positive demands for all goods guarantee positive 
output for all varieties. 
Once we allow for trade and the country finds itself to be small in the global 
economy with prices pre-determined in the world, drastic alteration in production 
structure takes place. For each industry only one variety will survive or for one of 
the industries two varieties will survive and the rest will produce only one variety. 
The logic behind such “finite” change has been explained in Jones and Marjit (1992). 
Large shocks to the system will lead to vanishing varieties. For each industry the 
variety that promises highest return to the specific factor survives. The rest are 
imported from abroad. In a way the most productive of all varieties survives under 
competition as measured by the highest return to the specific factor. Note that in the 
case one of the industries produces two varieties. Wage rate is determined there via 
the standard HOS mechanism. Thus we shall have either a pure specific factor model 
or a system where (n-1) sectors will have a specific factor structure and the residual a 
2X2 HOS framework. Once factor prices are all determined the non-surviving 
varieties will have “flat” average cost functions. Several applications of this structure 
have been attempted in the literature such as Beladi and Marjit (1992), Marjit and 
Beladi ( 1996, 1999), Marjit (1991, 2003) etc. 
4. International Factor Mobility, Wage Distribution and Finite Change 
A question that trade theorists have been busy investigating has to do with 
the impact of trade in goods and factors on inequality within a country. This became 
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a topic of intense investigation over the last two decades as rich and poor countries 
alike started exhibiting a rise in the skill premium. Typically a rise in the exports of 
countries using mostly unskilled labor intensive items should be accompanied by a 
decline in the relative wage of skilled workers and the reverse should happen in 
nations that exports skilled labor intensive goods. That is the usual prediction of 
HOS framework. Somehow that did not happen and other alternative explanations 
based on technological change and capital movement have been floated. Feenstra 
(2004) deals with it extensively. 
In this section we provide a few examples where international factor flows 
have drastically different implications for skilled wage premium within an economy. 
In the process we reiterate our stand regarding the well known factor price 
equalization theorem. We shall argue that even with identical technologies, no factor 
intensity reversals and all other standard assumptions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model 
factor prices may not be equalized if the countries specialize in non-overlapping sets 
of goods. Beladi, Kar and Marjit (2013) and Marjit and Kar (2011) develop two cases 
with emigration and international capital flow and demonstrate how production 
structure alter due to large shocks. In one case the impact of wage distribution 
drastically alters and in the other countries are affected asymmetrically to reveal 
factor price differences. 
While Marjit and Kar (2005) argues that emigration of the skilled can improve 
the wage distribution in favour of the unskilled. Similarly emigration of the 
unskilled can worsen the distribution against the unskilled contrary to the 
conventional wisdom as the wage of the emigrating factor must go up after 
14 
 
emigration. Yet the relative wage distribution may move against outflowing 
workers. It turns out that emigration may lead to other possible production 
structures different from the one used in  Marjit and Kar (2005) starting from a 
generalized production set up embodying specific factor framework as well as a  
Heckscher-Ohlin type sector which uses all factors of production. The result as 
shown by Beladi, Kar and Marjit (2011) reveals that post emigration wage 
distribution critically depends on which sectors will survive in equilibrium. Thus 
finite change can alter qualitative outcome. They argue that if skilled labor 
emigrates, return to capital may not have to fall as in Marjit and Kar (2005). In 
equilibrium the mixed sector and the pure unskilled sector survive and return to 
capital goes up wiping out the pure skilled sector and reducing unskilled wage. It is 
important to realize that mandatory survival of a sector pins down the maximum 
return to a factor used in that sector. But with large shocks or finite change, that 
concerned factor may quit that sector altogether and join a new sector or can engage 
exclusively in another existing sector. Such movement will allow the factor to earn 
much more than what it would have if it was restricted to operate only in one sector. 
The possibility of vanishing and emerging sectors can accommodate for wider range 
of variations in factor prices. 
In the companion piece Marjit and Kar (2011) illustrates a case where 
international capital flow can increase skill premium across countries which is 
difficult to obtain in a standard Heckscher-Ohlin model. In a world where one 
country exports skilled labor intensive good and other the unskilled labor intensive 
good, better prospects of trade will increase skill premium in one and reduces in the 
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other. With capital flowing from North to South each country may specialize in 
different subsets of goods and skilled wage relative to unskilled wage or the wage 
gap can rise everywhere. 
We start with a variant of the specific factor and HOS model3 
XKXSSX Prawa =+       (4) 
  YKYLY Prawa =+       (5) 
             ZKZLZSSZ Prawawa =++      (6) 
             SZaXa SZSX =+       (7) 
  LZaYa LZLY =+       (8) 
             KZaYaXa KZKYKX =++      (9) 
A sector or industry like Z is added to the specific factor structure. One can 
interprete X, a primarily skilled sector, Y, a primarily unskilled sector and Z, a 
general one where both skilled and unskilled work together. Capital nonetheless is 
required everywhere. A similar production structure exists in the rest of the world 
(ROW). Suppose to start with  > ∗, the real return to capital in the ROW. As one 
allows for international capital flow, the new world equilibrium is reached at ' 
where  > ' > ∗. As  decreases upto ' in the home country, there are more 
goods than factors. (4) – (6) are allowed to determine only two factor prices Sw  and 
w , the wages of skilled and unskilled workers. Thus one of the industries must 
                                                           
3 We use following symbols to describe the set of equations. Note that here ( ⇒ price of the jth 
commodity ( j= X, Y ); * ⇒ skilled wage;  ⇒ unskilled wage;  ⇒ rate of return to K; +( ⇒	input-
output coefficient (i≠ -; i = S,L,K and j = X,Y,Z); /̅  total supply of skilled labor; &1  total supply of 
capital; and  23  total supply of unskilled labor; 456 ⟹the value shrae of ith cinput in jth commodity; 
∧	⟹	proportional change. 
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vanish. Here is how it goes. Suppose Z is “labor” intensive. A drop in r will increase 
both Sw  and w  and will render Z unsustainable due to competitive pressure with 
unit cost of producing Z exceeding exogenous world price. 
Therefore, from (4) and (5) 
 
SX
KX
S
r
w
θ
θ ˆ
ˆ
−
=            (10) 
LY
KY rw
θ
θ ˆ
ˆ
−
=          (11) 
9*	 − 9 > 0 if 45; > 456       (12) 
Let us now turn to the ROW. There r has gone up. Hence by similar logic i.e. 
Z is labor intensive, it is unlikely that Z will vanish. In fact Marjit and Kar (2011) 
demonstrates that with Y and Z being produced production of X may vanish and *	 
in fact will rise. Note that with higher r and higher *	 production of X will cease to 
remain competitive. Also note that in a pure specific factor structure	*	must go 
down with a rise in r. Thus we shall have an equilibrium where both  *	 and r are 
higher and w is lower. Hence in both countries  
<	
   must go up. Such a result is 
driven by large shocks or finite change whereby the pattern of specialization alters 
drastically. 
Conclusion of Marjit and Kar (2011) demonstrating a rise in local 
<	
  following 
international capital movement has to allow the closure of the pure skilled sector in 
the North, where only mixed sector survives. Such an outcome is definitely at odds 
with conventional wisdom and general perception. However, in an extended version 
of the paper they try to show that with imported intermediates, the South can 
produce a cheaper intermediate as capital cost comes down and that in turn may 
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help the pure skilled sector in the North even when skilled wage and return to 
capital in the North increase. 
In another interesting extension of such type of models Mandal and Marjit 
(2012) shows how corruption as an activity may be squeezed out due to international 
capital mobility. Mandal and Marjit (2012) used a structure quite akin to Marjit and 
Kar (2011). Here goods’ prices are noramilized to unity and it is assumed that 
Production of both X and Y are symmetrically affected by corruption related 
transaction costs denoted by = which is exogenously fixed. This is covered by a part 
of the value of per unit of outputs. Thus by definition corruption smoothening 
intermediation requires all factors of production. Further Z defines a sector 
comprising only corruption related intermediation activity and each unit of 
production or transaction of both X and Y requires one unit of Z. 
In such a scenario an inflow of foreign capital depresses r. In what follows 
both * and  would increase. The rate of rise of * and  entirely hinges upon 
factors’ share in X and Y, respectively. Subsequently the value of lost output due to 
corruption related intermediation must increase as both * and  rise and skilled 
and unskilled workers are used as specific factors in X and Y respectively. Also note 
that Z will also increase since (X+Y) has to be identical with Z as intermediation is 
required for per unit of output. If for some reason the cost of intermediation becomes 
greater than the value of intermediation, Z will not survive. Only X and Y would 
exist and Z would vanish from the structure. Underlying arguments are as follows. 
As *	and w increase, cost of intermediation increases countered by a decline in . If 
Z is “labor” intensive implying a low cost share of capital, the cost will exceed = and 
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Z will vanish. This is trivially true if 45> = 0. If = is not allowed to go up, workers are 
better off being employed in X and Y rather than in intermediation. This is ensured if 
the following condition is satisfied 
?@AB@<B
@<C
@AC +
@AD
@ED
@EC
@AC	
F < 1  
For reverse argument there will be no X and Y, only Z would theoretically exist. But 
this is not feasible by definition as Z is a by-product of X and Y. Now we are left 
with the possibility where intermediation cost is exactly equal to the lost value of 
output. In that case either X or Y may vanish from the system. X would no longer be 
produced if 45; > 456 or 4*; < 4H6. Production of X would be non-viable when unit 
cost would be higher than unit price which is normalized to unity. We already know 
that r falls and * rises. When * rises by a greater extent then only the cost of 
production may outweigh price. In order to get this outcome the share of capital in X 
has to be sufficiently high or the share of labor has to be sufficiently low compared 
to that of in Y. For analogous reasoning Y would be vanished if 45; < 456 and all 
unskilled workers have to go to the intermediation sector for survival. Thus what we 
see here is that the possibility of a sector vanishing essentially depends on the factor 
intensity assumption and more importantly a country may get rid of corruption only 
by allowing foreign capital to come in. Higher dimensional trade theory and finite 
change arguments can only provide with satisfactory explanation for such an 
outcome. 
The issue of finite change in association with two-sided wage inequality has 
been tried in a very recent attempt by Dutta, Kar and Marjit (2013). They used a 
19 
 
variant of Krugman (1981) where both North and South start with production of 
both homogenous good and slightly differentiated varieties. Producer of each 
variety is the sole supplier of its variety and hence market becomes monopolistically 
competitive. In such a set up it has been shown that international mobility of labor 
and capital between North and South may lead to finite change in the production 
patterns and eventually South produces only homogeneous product and North 
produces different varieties. Emigration of skilled labor in this backdrop raises the 
skilled wage first and then raises the price of some goods as supply falls short of 
domestic demand. Under some reasonable conditions price may go up less than the 
increase in cost leading to what we call finite change or closure of the activity. 
Movement of capital may also have similar kind of alteration effects in production 
pattern. 
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